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COMMENTS

PRIVACY IN ILLINOIS: TORTS WITHOUT
REMEDIES
If the jurisprudence of the last century has taught us anything, it is
the necessity of recognizing
that law cannot be static, unless a soci1
ety is also static.
INTRODUCTION

Anticipating threats to the individual posed by the advancing technology of the twentieth century, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis published a plea 2 for the recognition and legal
protection of a new personal right,3 the right of privacy. 4 Warren
and Brandeis intended the new right they proposed to protect
individual independence, dignity, and integrity.5 The legal concepts that have evolved from that
seminal article have had a
6
profound impact on our society.
1. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 255 (1966).
2. Many commentators have speculated about why the article was ever
written. William L. Prosser wrote that press coverage of the wedding of
Warren's daughter prompted the article. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 383 (1960). Apparently the article was written primarily by Louis Brandeis, at the urging of Samuel Warren who disliked media coverage of Boston social life, particularly social gatherings at his home. Id.
3. For a discussion of the nature of the interest protected by a right of
privacy, see generally Gordon, Right of Propertyin Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553 (1960).
4. Privacy was first defined as the right of a person "to be let alone" in
T. COOLEY, LAw OF TORTS 29. (2d ed. 1888). The phrase was then quoted in
Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
Privacy has also been defined as the right of "inviolate personality." Id. at
205. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 971 (1964). Bloustein-defined the principle of "inviolate personality" as the "individual's independence, dignity and
integrity; it defines man's essence as a unique and self-determining being."
Id.
The Right of Privacy is now regarded as one of the most influential law
review articles ever written. Prosser stated that the article "has come to be
regarded as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals
upon the American law." Prosser, supra note 2, at 383. See also commentators cited infra note 23.
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193-97, 200-05.
6. See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
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Warren and Brandeis considered the concept of the right of
privacy as an extension of the law's "recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. '7 The interests
which had previously been protected were considered to be
forms of a protectible property interest. 8 Warren and Brandeis
asserted that the complexity of advancing civilization was
threatening to destroy man's cherished need for solitude and
privacy. 9 The right to be protected would be a right to the immunity of the person as against the world, a right to inviolate
personality.' 0
The diverse circumstances" in which a right of privacy may
be raised preclude precise categorization. In spite of this difficulty, Dean William Prosser identified four distinct torts in his
analysis 12 of privacy case law: intrusion upon the plaintiff's
physical seclusion or solitude; the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; publicity which places
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation,
for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiffs name
or likeness. 13 Prosser warned that each of his categories may be
"subject ... to different rules" and that confusion would follow
from the application of the elements of one privacy tort to
14
another.
Despite the fact that Prosser's classification represented an
attempt to clarify privacy law, the classification was instrumental in restricting the development of the tort as courts attempted
to fit each privacy cause of action into one of the four Prosser
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193. Warren and Brandeis
noted the growing recognition of new rights which have expanded protection of the individual beyond physical interference with his life or property.
The scope of the law's protection has expanded to include man's spiritual
nature. Id.
8. Id. at 193-94, 200-05.
9. Id. at 195-96.
10. Id. at 205, 211.
11. One need only consult the legal encyclopedias to recognize the wide
variety of cases falling under the privacy rubric. 41 Am. JuR. PRIVACY § 2

n.11 (1942); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 2 (1952).
12. Prosser attempted to classify over three hundred cases according to
four different interests. Prosser, supra note 2, at 388. See infra notes 200-02
and accompanying text.
13. Prosser, supra note 2, at 389. Prosser acknowledged the diversity of
privacy actions. Based on case law, he stated: "The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with
the right of the plaintiff. .. ." Id.
14. Id. Prosser believed that confusion would result from the carryover
of privacy concepts from one tort to the next. Id.
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categories. 15 These attempts by the courts have resulted in the
confusion which Prosser anticipated. 16 In many instances, the
confusion results from the blending and blurring of elements of
the four categories of the privacy torts, not only with each other,
but with other tort actions, such 8as defamation 17 and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.'
Illinois in particular has experienced much confusion. It
has had considerable difficulty determining which, if any, of the
privacy torts are actionable under its current common-law doctrines. 19 In addition, inconsistencies between Illinois state
courts and Illinois federal courts in the determination and the
20
application of Illinois law have created further complications.
This comment proposes a solution to the existing confusion
of the Illinois courts. Prosser's categorization should be consolidated into a single, unified theory of a privacy cause of action.
That theory would incorporate both the concepts originally
enunciated by Warren and Brandeis and the developments of
the cause of action caused by sociological and technological advances. A single theory, using all four of Prosser's categories,
would provide a conceptual foundation on which any privacy
cause of action may stand.
This comment first examines the evolution of privacy law in
Illinois, beginning with an analysis of early decisions which restricted its growth. The comment considers the rationale for the
Illinois courts' reluctance to expand the right of privacy. The
comment then compares the development of Illinois state law to
15. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.

16. See infra notes 51-165 and accompanying text.
17. 'The fundamental difference between a right of privacy and a right
to freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns one's own
peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily one's reputation."
Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d
753, 755 (1940). See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 1093 (1962) (defamation and privacy include situations where there
was no real injury to the plaintiff's reputation); Prosser, supra note 2, at 398
(law of privacy may be capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole
law of defamation). For a general discussion of the mixture of interests in a
privacy action, see Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?,4 S.D.L.
REV., 1,18 (1959).
18. Prosser, supra note 2, at 422. The two torts are often alleged in the
same suit in cases involving harassing phone calls for collection purposes.
See Bowden v. Spiegal, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950); Smith &
Straske, Collection Procedures and Right of Privacy, 36 FLA. B.J. 1085
(1962). Dean Wade stated: "[T]here is real reason to conclude that the
principle behind the law of privacy is much broader than the idea of privacy
itself, and that the whole law of privacy will become a part of the large tort
of intentional infliction of mental suffering." Wade, Defamation and the
Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1124-25 (1962).
19. See infra notes 53-167 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
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the contemporaneous, but divergent, decisions in Illinois federal
courts and examines the resulting inconsistencies in the determination of state law. The comment begins with a brief history
of the changing social values underlying the development of privacy law in other jurisdictions.
THE HISTORY OF PRIVACY LAW

Nearly a century ago, Warren and Brandeis sought to protect the private individual from the mental pain and distress
caused by the intrusions of the press. 2' Their article reflected
the general tenor of the times and gave early impetus to the development of the recognition of a tort remedy for the violation of
a right of privacy. 22 Development of the cause of action was
spurred by the recognition it received from legal scholars who
reevaluated old problems in light of the newly suggested remedy.23 Although the Warren-Brandeis plea gained scholarly ac24
ceptance, judicial recognition was sporadic.
21. Warren and Brandeis concerned themselves only with the public
disclosure of private, but truthful facts, about an individual which were
likely to cause emotional turmoil. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMPT. PROBS. 326, 330 (1966).
22. Harry Kalven suggests why: "I suspect that fascination with the
great Brandeis trade mark, excitement over the law at a point of growth,
and appreciation of privacy as a key value have combined to dull the normal
critical sense of judges and commentators ...

"

Kalven, supra note 21, at

328 (1966).
23. Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REV. 1
(1959) (relationship to defamation, interference with interest in property,
physical intrusion, right of publicity); Dickler, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S.L. REV. 435 (1936) (analogous to trespass, libel,
unfair trade practices & appropriation of potential profits); Feinberg, Recent
Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948) (examination of interests protected); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV.
239 (1932) (analyzed as covering seven different phases of personality);
Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liabilityfor Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426 (unanimity of interests in privacy);
Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 B.U.L. REV. 353 (1932) (privacy as absolute right not to be interfered with to a person's distress, discomfort or damage); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L, REV. 693 (1912) (privacy
as protection from publicity); Ludwig, "Peaceof Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734 (1948) (proposes a uniform statute); Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH.
L. REV. 526 (1941) (development of the tort); Ragland, The Right of Privacy,
17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1929) (review of status of privacy law); Winfield, Privacy, 47
LAw. Q. REV. 23 (1931) (privacy joined with a pecuniary or business interest); Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1952) (endorses broader recognition for relief from abuses of media).
24. In the first twenty years following the proposal of the tort by Warren
and Brandeis, recognition occurred in only five states. Pavesich v. New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (picture of a wellknown artist used in an advertisement for life insurance); Foster-Milburn
Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424,120 S.W. 364 (1909) (use of forged testimonial letter
as an endorsement to advertise Doan's Kidney Pills), affd, 137 Ky. 837, 127
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The majority of the early cases were litigated in New York 25
and actually were attempts to interpret the New York privacy
statute. 26 The New York statute,2 7 approved in 1903, was enacted by the legislature after the New York courts had refused
to recognize a common-law right of privacy. 28 The New York

statute, however, provided only limited protection. 29 Based on
the language of the statute, New York courts sustained a cause
S.W. 476 (1910); Shulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704,42 So. 227 (1906) (crmiinal
suspect sued for return of photograph in police ffies taken while in jail);
Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) (plaintiff attempted to expunge a fraudulent birth records).
By 1930, the common-law right was recognized in three additional
states. Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926) (photographer took pictures of
private expedition over North Pole); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532
(1918) (owner of store took secret movies of plaintiff while she shopped and
used them as an advertisement in neighborhood theater); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911) (picture and statement attributed
to plaintiff used in advertisement).
At the end of 1940, five more states recognized the right. Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (film depicted unsavory incidents in life of
rehabilitated prostitute); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S.E. 55 (1938) (young lady mistakenly identified in advertisement as Mile.
Sally Payne, exotic red-haired Venus); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192
S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1939) (insurance agent used plaintiff's name without
permission).
25. See Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and
History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553 (1960).
26. Id. at 565-90. See, e.g., D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 A.D.
453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1913) (story on a Congo cannibal feast attributed to a
famous explorer); Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (romance magazine published views on sex attributed to
rabbi); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (model's picture used to advertise bedsheets); Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (picture of professional model

in magazine article entitled "Man Hungry"); Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co.,
207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (picture of boy in article called
"Gang Boy"); Valerni v. Hearst Magazines, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (plaintiff's picture used in article about waiters); Sinclair v. Postal
Telegraph & Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (tampered picture of
actor used for advertisement for telegraph company). See also cases discussed in Dickler, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S.L.
REV. 435, 452-56 (1936).
27. 1903 N.Y. LAws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (McKinney 1903), codified as amended,
N.Y. CIViL RIGHTs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1903). See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
28. Enactment of the statute was the result of the uproar created by the
New York court's dismissal of the privacy action in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Plaintiff sued to enjoin the
publication of her portrait on posters advertising Franklin Mills Flour which
were displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons, and other public places. She
alleged that she was humiliated and caused to suffer greatly by this commercial expression and that her privacy had been invaded. Id.
29. The statute provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a
minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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of action only when a person's name or likeness was used for
commercial or trade purposes. 30 A publication intended as a
news feature was not covered. 3 1 The abundance of New York
case law interpreting the privacy statute brought the issues to
the forefront of judicial inquiry and served to highlight the importance of the new tort.32 Using the New York statute as a
model, other states adopted the requirement that an invasion of
33
privacy must be based on a commercial exploitation.
The initial number of cases was not so important as the
N.Y. CrviL RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1903). New York state courts have
held that New York plaintiffs have no general right to sue for invasion of
privacy except as conferred by statute. E.g., Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
45 N.Y.2d 493, 382 N.E.2d 1145,410 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1978) (no so-called commonlaw right of privacy exists in New York); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43
N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (no right to judicial relief
for invasion of privacy other than under sections 50 and 51); Flores v.
Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164 N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959) (right
to privacy is limited by statute). The courts' reluctance to go beyond the
statute indicates a perception of legislative preemption.
30. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E.
1097 (1908) (plaintiff sued defendant for exhibiting her picture as a redemption premium for its trading stamps), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911); Wyatt v.
James McCreery Co., 126 A.D. 650, 111 N.Y.S. 86 (1908) (plaintiff sued photographer for unauthorized circulation and sale of her picture). See supra
note 26.
The New York privacy statute was initially enacted to provide a remedy
for invasions of privacy which enriched the defendant. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed without comment a lower court's incorporation of all four forms of tortious invasion of privacy into the statute.
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964), afftd,
18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and remanded
on constitutionalgrounds, 387 U.S. 239, affd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967). In addition, after looking to a prior District of Columbia case, the New York court held that the plaintiff's complaint for unreasonable intrusion was legally sufficient under the statute. Nader v.
General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
This development of New York law flies in the face of a statute seemingly
restricting the cause of action to appropriation of name or likeness for commercial purposes and the decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), which emphatically stated that there is
no common law right to privacy in New York.
31. See, e.g., Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570,
124 N.Y.S. 780 (1910) (defendant published a serialized biography and picture of famous pugilist; dissemination of information was not a use for trade
purposes); Moser v. Press Pub. Co., 59 Misc. 78, 109 N.Y.S. 963 (1908) (newspaper published picture and unpleasant story concerning plaintiff). If the
news story is embellished and fictionalized, recovery is often granted. See,
e.g., Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953)
(fictionalized article concerning person tried & acquitted of murder); Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (sensationalized stories of murder conviction and subsequent reversal); Reed v. Real
Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945) (publication of
plaintiff's photograph in connection with story of crime).
32. Gordon, supra note 27.
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-405 (1978);
VA. CODE § 650 (1950).
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quality of the protection afforded by the decisions. 34 The law
rapidly became more precise. Restrictions and limitations, first
suggested by the Warren-Brandeis article, began to appear.
Public figures, such as artists 35 and politicians, 36 for example,
were limited in the protection they received; generally they
were not afforded the same protection as private persons. 37 Fur34. The boundaries of the law became mapped with greater precision.
See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (plaintiff's
picture used in satirical article on cab drivers); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250,
37 So. 2d 118 (1948) (daughters sued radio station for broadcast of tale recounting how their father, though presumed murdered, had skipped town
with family bank account and had established himself in California; his
body was returned to Alabama because of a provision in his will); Cason v.
Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944) (objectionable character sketch in
novel); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762
(1956) (picture of mutiliated and decomposed body of eight-year-old published on front page); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952)
(landlord and his wife moved into living room of tenant who was unwilling
to give up possession); Hinish v. Meier &Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438
(1941) (unauthorized use of individual's name on telegram sent to state's
chief executive); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (tenant sued landlord for planting listening device in her apartment). See also
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
35. Gautier v. Pro-Football Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (unauthorized telecast of plaintiff and his aerial act); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre
Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938) (respected actress sued burlesque house for displaying her picture on exhibit outside theater). Contra Pavesich v. New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). Plaintiff was a
well-known artist whose picture was used in an advertisement for life insurance placed next to a sickly looking, ill-dressed individual. Above the portrait of the artist were the words, "Do It Now. The Man Who Did." Above
the other photograph were the words, "Do It While You Can. The Man Who
Didn't." Id. The case became the leading precedent for many years and
provided the legal foundation for similar rulings in many other
jurisdictions.
36. See Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285
(1899). The widow of a well-known attorney and politician sued to stop a
cigar manufacturer from using the decedent's name and portrait on the label of defendant's cigars. The court, after an extensive examination of authorities, found the "so-called 'right of privacy' ha[d] not as yet found an
abiding place" in Michigan jurisprudence. Id. at 373, 80 N.W. at 285. Contra
State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924). Senator
Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, a Progressive party candidate for President
of the United States, sued to stop the secretary of state from certifying the
names of persons nominated by the LaFollette State pirty to fill various
state offices. He alleged that the voters would be misled into thinking that a
vote for the LaFollette party candidates would be a vote for the presidential
electors pledged to support the Wisconsin senator. The court issued the
injunction. Id. at 94, 229 P. at 318.
37. "Since, then, the propriety of publishing the very same facts may
depend wholly upon the person concerning whom they are published, no
fixed formula can be used to prohibit obnoxious publications." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 4, at 215. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (famous child prodigy could not retreat to private
life), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F.
Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (plaintiff depicted as attempting to persuade woman not to commit suicide); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253
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thermore, courts, relying on constitutional guarantees of free38
dom of press and speech, restricted individual protection;
freedom of the press was frequently placed above the rights of
the private individual. 39 Defenses of newsworthiness 4° or truthfulness were usually upheld. 41 In many cases, publicity was rec42
ognized as absolutely essential to the welfare of the public.
Even as these considerations worked to limit the application
of privacy law, the modern development of mass media forced
the courts to expand the scope of the privacy right. Where once
an individual's privacy could be invaded only through the use of
printed matter, the invention of electronic media offered new veP.2d 441 (1953) (photograph of plaintiffs in affectionate pose); Jacova v.
Southern Radio &Tel. Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (telecast of gambling raid
identifying plaintiff as gambler).
38. E.g., Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (D. Mass. 1894). The wife
of a deceased inventor attempted to enjoin the publication of a biography
and picture of her late husband. The court held that Corliss was a public
figure, and "an inventor who asks for and desires public recognition may be
said to have surrendered his right to the public." Id. at 282. See also Smith
v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926). Plaintiff organized a private expedition to fly
over the North Pole, giving picture rights for the adventure to Pathe News
Service. While arrangements were under way, a photographer for International News Service took pictures of the preparations. Plaintiff alleged that
the expedition was a business and that the pictures taken by the INS photographer would render the Pathe film valueless. The court said defendant
had a right to photograph and gather news about the expedition, that there
could be no right of privacy adhering to an enterprise of this public character, even though it was financed by private individuals. Id. at 418.
39. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (eccentric child
prodigy could not withdraw from public life), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940). See also Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733,
20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962), in which the court stated: "A consideration of the
limits of the right of privacy requires the exercise of a nice discrimination
between the private right 'to be let alone' and the public right to news and
information; there must be a weighing of the private interest as against the
public interest." Id. at 745, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14. E.g., Barbieri v. NewsJournal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963) (last person to feel the lash under
Delaware's whipping-post law); Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 30 S.D.
104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963) (picture used to illustrate story on state's elderly
citizens and financial problems posed by retirement).
40. Certain outrageous cases, for example, have forced even the right of
the press to give way to an individual's right to seclusion. E.g., Bazemore v.
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (picture published of
Flaintiffrs dead, deformed newborn son); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17
il. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958) (news photographs of widow of police
officer, who had been killed while arresting an escaped criminal, were republished by defendant three months later accompanying article in Inside
Detective entitled "If You Love Me Slip Me a Gun"); Douglas v. Stokes, 149
Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912) (photographer printed extra copies of picture of
dead baby).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926); Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). See also Felcher &
Rubin, Privacy,Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88

L.J. 1577, 1598-1601 (1979).
42. Felcher &Rubin, supra note 41.
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hicles for tortious actions. 4 3 Consequently, the courts became
more generous in providing protection to individuals,H particularly from advertisers and other businessmen who derived their
45
profits through the exploitation of others' privacy.

William Prosser's influence on the growth of the right of privacy may surpass that of Warren and Brandeis. 46 With Prosser's publication, 4 7 and the subsequent adoption of his
categorization in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,48 the con-

cept of a right of privacy was established in American jurisprudence.49 Today, nearly every case involving an asserted right of
privacy cites either Prosser or the Restatement (Second) of
43. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952)
(half-time performances of animal trainer were telecast).
44. E.g., Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S.E. 68 (1905) (plaintiffs picture in advertisement for life insurance); Kunz
v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918) (film of plaintiff shopping in defendant's store shown as advertisement in local theater); Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909) (testimonial letter to advertise kidney pills); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911) (plaintiff's picture in advertisement for watches). Contra Henry v. Cherry and
Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909) (plaintiff's picture in advertisement for auto
coat).
45. At the same time, the courts were forced to recognize a gray area
between the two extremes of informing the public and of advertising for
profit. Courts today struggle with the concept of fictionalization by balancing private interests against public interests. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. See Kalven, supra note 21, at 330.
47. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977). William Prosser was

the reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). The incorporation of Prosser's analysis replaced a very generalized treatment in the
RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 867 (1934).

49. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-73 &
574 n.11 (1977). The right of privacy is legally protected through the common law in most states, with the apparent exception of Minnesota, Nevada,
North Dakota, and Wyoming. In nine of these states - Florida, Georgia,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and
Virginia - the law is governed by statute. No state rejects the right of privacy, either in its statutes or case law. R. SMrrH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL PRIVACY LAws 18 (1981). See also Prosser, supra note 2, at 386-88.
Recognition of the right of privacy by the states occurred quickly compared to the scholarly disagreement which occurred during the first fifty
years of the tort's development. One scholar wrote:
Fifty years ago the right which every normal and decent person feels in
living his life to himself appeared likely to be protected by a legal recognition of a right to privacy. Unfortunately the compaign for its recognition, brilliantly begun by the article written by Justice Brandeis and
published in the HarvardLaw Review has almost completely failed.
Bohlen, Fi.fty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REV. 725, 731 (1937). For examples
of the debate over the existence of the right, see Lisle, The Right of Privacy
(A Contra View), 19 KY. L.J. 137 (1931); Moreland, The Right of Privacy Today, 19 KY. L.J. 101 (1931); O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV.
437 (1902).
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Torts.
The problem remains, however, that not every cause of action currently asserted fits within Prosser's categorization. The
attempts to fit every privacy cause of action into a specific "Prosser category" have produced problems. In Illinois, the attempts
have resulted in divergent decisions which have confused privacy law in Illinois.
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAw IN ILLINOIS

The Illinois Supreme Court did not address the question of
whether a common law right of privacy existed in Illinois until
1970. 51 The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, however, had already recognized a cause of action for the Prosser
category of commercial exploitation of the plaintiff's name or
likeness. 52 The other three privacy torts-intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false-light publicitywere not expressly recognized by any Illinois court. Although
privacy torts were frequently alleged, the cases were generally
dismissed for two reasons: first, the courts noted that the plaintiffs usually had another theory of recovery which the courts
considered adequate; 53 and second, Illinois courts appeared to
give greater deferrence to the defenses raised by the defendants
54
than to the injury alleged by the plaintiffs.
Limited Recognition of the Privacy Cause of Action
The first Illinois case to recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy was Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.55 Eick involved
the commercial exploitation of a photograph of the plaintiff,56 an
50. For a listing of some of the cases using the Prosser categorization,
see Wade, supra note 17, at 1095 n.13.
51. Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 343, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (court stated
that right of privacy should be recognized although court denied relief to
plaintiff because of his public status). See infra notes 112-119 and accompa-

nying text.
52. E.g., Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39

(1965); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64
(1960); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761
(1958); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
53. E.g., Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d
37 (1976) (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
54. See infra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.

55. 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
56. Defendant used a photograph of the plaintiff without her permission
in an advertisement for its dog food. The advertisement showed plaintiff, a
blind girl, as a future donee of a seeing-eye dog. Because plaintiff already
owned a seeing-eye dog, she had no need for another. Plaintiff claimed that
the advertisement caused her to lose respect in the community and to suffer humiliation. Id. at 294, 106 N.E.2d at 743.
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action which, if brought in New York, would clearly have fallen
within the scope of the New York statute.5 7 Although the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District noted that some jurisdictions limited the right of privacy action to commercial
exploitation,5 8 the Eick court did not discuss such a limitation.5 9
The court instead found that the facts of the case would satisfy
even the narrowest definition of an invasion of privacy.60 Subsequently, other appellate courts in Illinois limited Eick's application strictly to identical factual situations and refused to extend
61
its findings.
The defenses rejected by Eick can be applied to all four privacy torts, and not just to the tort based on commercial exploitation. Under Eick, the only limitations which may defeat the
assertion of a privacy right are consent (express or implied) or
matters involving a legitimate public interest. 62 Shortly thereafter, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted a
defamation defense in a case involving a privacy cause of action.
In Branson v. Fawcett Publications,Inc.,63 the plaintiff alleged that the press had invaded his privacy by publishing a
photograph of his racing car in a collision. 64 The court analyzed
the case in the same manner it would have had the complaint
57. The New York statute protects plaintiffs from the commercial exploitation of their name or likeness. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
58. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. at 299, 106 N.E.2d at 745.
59. Id. The court made extensive reference to authorities and decisions
of other jurisdictions which had explicitly recognized the right. The court
cited cases from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina, in addition to statutes from New York, Utah and Virginia
which recognized the right of privacy. The court also noted the following
authorities and articles in support of its position: F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS, ch. 12 (1944); Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law
of Privacy, 48 COLuM. L.R. 713 (1948); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L.
REV. 237 (1932); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L.R. 693 (1912);
Nizer, Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 362-64 (1915); Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); Winfield, Privacy, 47 LAw Q. REV. 23
(1931). In addition, the court noted that the right is defined and approved in
the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867.
60. Id. The court stated, "[t]he instant case involves unauthorized advertising use of plaintiff's picture and would be comprehended within the
narrowest definition of the right of privacy." Id.
61. See, e.g., Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 ll. App. 3d 1006, 345
N.E.2d 37 (1976).
62. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. at 299, 106 N.E.2d at 745. The
court found that these limitations were inapplicable. Id.
63. 124 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
64. Id. at 430.
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alleged an action in defamation. 65 Although the Branson court
cited Eick and determined that the publication of the photograph might be considered a commercial exploitation, 66 the
court found that it was too blurred for anyone to recognize the
plaintiff and, therefore, was not "of and concerning" the
plaintiff.

67

Six years later, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District cited the Branson decision when it held that, generally, a
plaintiff must be sufficiently identified in the publication to be
entitled to protection against the use of his name or likeness. 68
The same court then applied a similar defamation defense in
Buzinski v. Do All Co. 69 when it held that the mere incidental
exploitation,
use of a name or likeness, even for commercial
70
does not constitute an invasion of privacy.
The most formidable defense to a privacy cause of action is
based on the first amendment. In privacy actions, a first amendment right has usually been found in three circumstances: if the
publication is a public record, 71 if the publication concerns a
public figure, 72 or if the publication is of public interest.73 Accepting the first amendment defense, courts in Illinois have repeatedly restricted the assertion of privacy actions when
65. The court stated, 'The violation of the right ...requires the use of
the personality, name or likeness of the individual. In this the action resembles the action for libel or slander .... As in the libel and slander
Id. at
cases, the picture of itself is not of and concerning the plaintiff ...
433.
"

66. Id. at 431-32.
67. Id. at 433. Several courts have held that there must be a sufficient
reference to the plaintiff to amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
E.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240 (D. Del. 1957)
(bank robbery); Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946)
(plaintiff was identified officer in novel).
68. Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64
(1960) (plaintiff was not featured or substantially publicized).
69. 31 111. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961).
70. Defendant published a picture of a "Land Yacht." Plaintiff's likeness appeared near the car but he was neither named nor otherwise identified. The court dismissed the complaint, stating that the inclusion of
plaintiff's unidentified likeness was incidental and that the likeness was not
being used for commercial exploitation because there was no suggestion
that he endorsed the product. Id. at 192-93, 175 N.E.2d at 579-80.
71. E.g., Oden v. Cahill, 79 Ill. App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d 1061 (1979) (arrest
record); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956)
(college newspaper wrote editorial on suit against college magazine). See
also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.

72. See supra notes 35-37 and infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
73. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670
(1951) (movie depicting actual conditions encountered by plaintiff while
serving in marine corps); Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing
Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940) (picture of plaintiff talking with captain of police). See infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text.
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matters of public interest were concerned. 74 Courts have held
that there is no invasion of personal privacy when the invasion
is deemed newsworthy or is a matter of legitimate public
75
concern.
The first amendment defense was first raised in the district
court in Rozhon v. Triangle Productions,Inc.,76 when a father
sued a publisher for printing a photograph of his deceased son
next to an article on teenage drug addiction. 77 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the limitation pronounced in
Eick 78 and held that at the time of the publication the father had
been "catapulted into an area of legitimate public news interest. '79 In other words, it is not necessary for an individual to

seek publicity actively in order to be of legitimate public news
interest.
In contrast, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
rejected the first amendment defense in Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co.80 In Annerino, the widow of a detective killed by a
gangster alleged that the defendant had exploited her personality by publishing her photograph beside a story of the murder.8 '
Although the Annerino court conceded that some invasions of
privacy may be justified as a proper exercise of freedom of the
press, it stated that the rule was not intended to be a license for
the press to "overstep the bounds of propriety and decency. '82
Annerino held that a claim for invasion of privacy would be
stated if a published story is really a device to facilitate commercial exploitation, rather than as a means for presenting
74. E.g., Cassidy v. America Broadcasting Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377
N.E.2d 126 (1978) (plaintiff's status as policeman on duty is area of public
interest); Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39
(1965) (publication of fact of murder is newsworthy); Buzinski v. Do-All
Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961) (public interest includes informational material); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 111. App. 2d 331,
168 N.E.2d 64 (1960) (articles on murder are legitimate public interest).
75. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
76. 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956).
77. Id.
78. A limitation which would defeat the action is a matter involving a
legitimate public interest. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. Rozhon v. Triangle Productions, Inc., 230 F.2d at 361.
80. 17 111. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958). In Annerino, the widow of a
detective, killed by a gangster, alleged that defendant had exploited her
personality by publishing her photograph beside a story of the murder. Id.
at 207, 149 N.E.2d at 762.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 209, 149 N.E.2d at 762. The court conceded that many invasions
of privacy by the press are lawful and the violators are not punished. Id. at
208-09, 149 N.E.2d at 762, citing Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18
S.W.2d 972 (1929), and 41 Am. JuR. Privacy § 23 (1942).
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information.
By rejecting the first amendment defense, the Annerino
court implied that it was expanding the holding in Eick beyond
strictly commercial situations. 84 The Annerino court used the
language of Warren and Brandeis when it stated that the Eick
court "intended to protect inviolate the personality of the individual. '85 But, in fact, the Annerino court's reasoning produced
no change in the Eick rule; its final holding was that the publication did not constitute a matter of legitimate public interest.86
The dicta in the Annerino opinion, therefore, raised some troubling questions when, later, the Illinois courts were faced with alleged invasions of privacy in non-commercial settings. 87 The
first amendment defense has frequently precluded consideration of various privacy claims.
An opportunity to consider the tort of "publication of private
facts" was precluded, for example, when the court was confronted with a first amendment defense in Bradley v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc. 88 The Bradley court referred to the decision of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Rozhon v. Triangle Productions, Inc. ,89 and then agreed with that court's holding that a
plaintiff could be "catapulted" into an area of legitimate public
news interest even without seeking public notoriety. 90 Consequently, the publication of private facts concerning a murder
victim and his family was allowed as a legitimate public concern;9 1 the first amendment defense made unnecessary any con83. 17 Ill. App. 2d at 209, 149 N.E.2d at 763. The court focused on the
dominant characteristic of a fictional story. If the purpose of the story was
not to convey information but merely to enhance circulation, then the story
is "a device to facilitate commercial exploitation." Id., quoting Hazlitt v.
Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538 (D.C. Conn. 1953). The court pointed
out that defendants increased the fictional value of the publication by adding continuity and dialogue concerning the plaintiffs personal thoughts.
Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 210, 149 N.E.2d at 763. See
also Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (imaginary conversations indicate a style used by writers of fiction).
84. Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d at 208, 149 N.E.2d at

762.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 211, 149 N.E.2d at 763.
87. See, e.g., Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill.
App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980);
Oden v. Cahill, 79 Ill. App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d 1061 (1979).
88. 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960).

89. 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956).
90. The Bradley court noted that the plaintiff had not been featured or
substantially publicized in the article. Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.,
26 Ill. App. 2d at 333, 168 N.E.2d at 66.
91. A mother sued for damages for her mental anguish caused by a publication concerning the murder of her son. Bradley v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d at 333, 168 N.E.2d at 65. The court also examined Metter
v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939), and noted
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sideration of the tort cause of action.
Although the Bradley court dismissed the cause of action on
the theory that the publication was of legitimate news interest,
the court did note an alternative basis for its decision. The
Bradley court cited two California cases which had held that an
invasion of the right of privacy is purely a personal action. 92 By
implication, Bradley held that the invasion of privacy of the
murder victim could not form the basis of a suit brought by the
victim's mother.93 According to the court, the mother would
have to prove an invasion of her own right of privacy in order to
94
have any cause of action.
Bradley was decided by the First District Appellate Court,
the same court which had first recognized a privacy action in
Eick and later had reexamined it in Annerino. In Bradley, the
First District Appellate Court began to hedge its position; it
noted that the
holding [in Eick ] is limited to its final conclusion .

.

. It was recog-

nized that any development of the right beyond that would be subject to scrutiny as particular cases were brought to the court and
distinction or extension defined. Eventually, a body of more specific principles 95than those approved in the Eick case will perhaps
be formulated.
Finding no well-defined precedent to support the plaintiff, the
Bradley court had no justification for extending tort coverage in
96
Illinois.
In Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co. ,97 the Appellate Court for
the First District attempted to clarify its holding in Bradley.
Once more, the court faced a first amendment defense and
that, if a person becomes involved in a matter of public interest, no invasion
of privacy occurs if his photograph is published with an account of the
event. Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d at 336, 168 N.E.2d at
66.
92. In Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659

(1958), the plaintiff alleged a violation of his right of privacy because of the
publication of a photograph of his daughter who was killed in an automobile

accident. In Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491
(1939), the plaintiff alleged a violation of his right of privacy because of the
publication of a photograph of his wife in an article concerning her suicide.
93. Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d at 336, 168 N.E.2d at
66. For a discussion of the survivability of a privacy cause of action, see
infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
Statutes of other jurisdictions allow a representative of a decedent's estate to file a privacy cause of action on behalf of the decedent. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 839.1 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-8 (1953); and VA. CODE § 8-650
(1950).
94. Bradley v. Cowles Magazine, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d at 336, 168 N.E.2d at
66.
95. Id. at 333, 168 N.E.2d at 65.
96. Id. at 336, 168 N.E.2d at 66.
97. 65 IMI.App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965).
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found that the article contained information of legitimate public
interest. 98 Moreover, the court found that the article remained
newsworthy in spite of a significant time interval between the
event and the publication of the article about it. 99
Again, as in Bradley, the court noted that the claim did not
survive the death of the principal. 100 Both the Bradley and Carlson holdings indicate that, in addition to first amendment defenses, a cause of action for privacy may face a defense of
abatement' 0 ' if the courts view the right as one based on a personal, rather than a property, right. 10 2 The Carlson court treated
98. Id. at 215, 213 N.E.2d at 42-43. Plaintiffs, the administrator of the estate and the children of a woman who had been raped and murdered,
brought a right of privacy action for damages for the publication of an article about the crime. Id. at 210-11, 213 N.E.2d at 40.
99. The court stated that the interval between the news event and the
publication of the story in a magazine is greater than the publication of a
news story in a newspaper. Id. at 215, 213 N.E.2d at 40. The court found that
a four-month interval was not significant; therefore, it held that the publication of the article was timely. Id. See also Rozhon v. Triangle Productions,
230 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1956) (five-month interval was not significant). Compare Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (twentymonth interval was not significant), with Wagner v. Fawcett Publications,
307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962). In its amicus curiae brief, Field Enterprises,
Inc., sought to substitute an alternative test to be applied in determining
whether the first amendment protects the publication of a news story.
Rather than determining whether the publication is timely, Field Enterprises argued that the test should be whether the publication is of continued public interest. The court found the publication was newsworthy and
saw no need to expand the defense. Id. at 411.
100. The court held that the estate of a decedent has no cause of action
for violation of the right of privacy. Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill.
App. 2d at 216, 213 N.E.2d at 42. The court quoted Maritote v. Desilu Prods.,
Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965), which stated, "IIIt is anomalous to speak of
the privacy of a deceased person." Id. at 420. For a further discussion of the
survivability of a privacy cause of action, see infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.

101. One of the first major court decisions involving privacy concerned
the survivability of the cause of action. Fifteen years after the death of a
well-known philantropist, a group revealed plans to erect a life-size statue
of her at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago. One of her relatives

objected to the display claiming that the feelings of the family would be
injured by the exhibition. The New York court permitted the display stating that the relatives of the deceased philanthropist could not maintain an
action based on Mrs. Schuyler's right of privacy "because whatever right of
privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her." Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434,
447, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895). See also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
102. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has specifically addressed the question of whether a privacy claim rests on a personal right or a property right. In Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965), the administratix of Al Capone's
estate, his wife and son claimed a property right to recover for unjust enrichment arising out of an alleged appropriation by defendants of the
"name, likeness and personality" of Al Capone. Id. The action resulted
from the defendant's commercially televised fictional broadcasts of "The
Two-Part Drama - The Untouchables" and the weekly series, "The Untouchables," telecast more than twelve years after Capone's death. Id. at
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the cause of action as a personal right based on the tort of appropriation of name or likeness. 10 3 The Carlson court failed to recognize that the plaintiffs were in reality asserting an action
which should properly have been classified as an intrusion into
104
seclusion.
The defense of consent has also been examined by Illinois
courts. In a defense of consent, the issue in dispute is usually
the scope of the consent. In Smith v. WGN, Inc.,105 for example,
the plaintiff agreed to "pose for a man that takes a movie"'1 6 that
was later shown on television as a commercial. 0 7 A question of
fact existed as to whether the use made of the movie was within
the scope of the consent given. In those cases in which the
question of the scope of consent was raised, consent was a successful defense each time. 10 8
420. Maritote held that "[c] omment, fictionalization and even distortion of a
dead man's career do not invade the privacy of his offspring, relatives or
friends. . . ." Id. It is apparent that Capone's notoriety influenced the
court's decision because the court was moved to quote from Shakespeare,
"The evil that men do lives after them. .. ." Id. See Saret &Stern, Publicity
and Privacy - Distinct Interests on the MisappropriationContinuum, 12
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 675, 694-95 (1981). See also infra notes 126, 171-177 and accompanying text.
As implied in the concurring opinion, this case may have been the first
case brought under Illinois law that was more properly a claim for an invasion of the right of publicity. Id. at 421 (Duffy, J., concurring). Under Bardley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960), the
assertion of the right would not have survived the death of Al Capone since
no Illinois court had recognized the type of property right asserted by the
plaintiffs. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the right of publicity, see infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
Recognition that a privacy claim involves a property right may have the
added effect of the availability of a longer statute of limitations. The Illinois
statute of limitations for injury to property is five years after the cause of
action accrued. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1983). The applicable Illinois
statute of limitations for personal actions is one year after the cause of action accrued. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1983).
103. The court stated: 'The article ... does [not] show an appropriation
of the personalities of the decedent's children, either by name or by likeness." Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 216, 213 N.E.2d 39,
43 (1965).
104. Id. at 212, 213 N.E.2d at 41. The plaintiffs contended that the publication "brought the plaintiffs out of the solitude which it was their right to
enjoy." Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant invaded their privacy
by reopening their wounds strictly for commercial exploitation. Id.
105. 47 Ill. App. 2d 183, 197 N.E.2d 482,(1964).
106. Id. at 185, 197 N.E.2d at 484.
107. Id.
108. Smith v. WGN, Inc., 47 111. App. 2d 183, 197 N.E.2d 482 (1964) (plaintiff
agreed to pose for movie); Dabbs v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 44 Ill.
App. 2d 438, 193 N.E.2d 876 (1963) (plaintiff agreed to supply defendant with
photographs for publicity stunts; subsequently, her picture appeared in
eauty contest to promote grand opening of defendant's store). See also
Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1959) (retouched
print of famous model used to advertise bed sheets).
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Through these decisions, the First District Appellate Court
set the boundaries of the cause of action for privacy in Illinois.
The First District Appellate Court was the only Illinois appellate
court even to consider the right of privacy cause of action until
the 1970s.10 9 When faced with a claim for appropriation of name
or likeness for commercial exploitation, the court had no difficulty in upholding the cause of action." 0 When a claim involved
one of the other three privacy torts, the court's opinions appeared uncertain and tentative."' It must be remembered that
this court was at least willing to address these issues in spite of
the absence of legislative and judicial guidelines. On the other
hand, the First District's inconsistent holdings have muddied
the waters for subsequent courts which are attempting to formulate standards.
Recognition by the Illinois Supreme Court
The recognition of a common law right of privacy by the Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold v. Levin" 2 should have removed any obstacles impeding the growth of the tort. The court
cited with approval all of the decisions made by the First District Appellate Court. 13 In defining the right, however, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that, given the proper
circumstances, the cause of action should be liberally construed." 4 The Leopold court itself, however, applied a conservative interpretation.
In Leopold, the plaintiff asserted a violation of his right of
privacy by the publication and distribution of a novel, a play,
n5
and a motion picture based on his exploits with Richard Loeb.
109. See Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill.
App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39
(1965); Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31 Ill.
App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill.
App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill.
App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958); Eick v.
Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).
110. E.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742
(1952).
111. See, e.g., Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 111. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d
39 (1965); Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31 Ill.
App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961).
112. 45 Ill.
2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
113. Id. at 439-40, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
114. The court stated: "We agree that there should be recognition of a
right of privacy ...Privacy is one of the sensitive and necessary human
values and undeniably there are circumstances under which it should enjoy
the protection of law." Id. at 440-41, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
115. In 1924, Richard Loeb and Nathan F. Leopold, Jr., pleaded guilty to
the murder and kidnapping of Bobby Franks. The novel, play, and subsequent movie, entitled "Compulsion," were based on the kidnapping and
murder of Bobby Franks and the prosecution of Leopold and Loeb. The
plaintiff alleged that the constitutional privileges of speech and press do not
extend to an exploitation of his personality for profit in "knowingly fiction-
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The Illinois Supreme Court's denial of this cause of action was
premised on three grounds: constitutional protection in a matter of public interest, continuing public interest in the plaintiff's
crime and prosecution, and plaintiff's continuing status as a
public figure. 116 When misappropriation of a name or likeness is
alleged, the court suggested that the public or private status of
the plaintiff and the nature of the alleged misuse will be carefully examined in order to determine whether a first amendment
defense exists. 117 Illinois courts now rely upon this distinction
between invasions of privacy for commercial appropriation and
invasions of privacy for newsworthy events. 118
Leopold has been the only pronouncement on privacy by
the Illinois Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the facts of Leopold
limited the court's discussion of the right of privacy action to the
tort of appropriation of name or likeness. The decision, therefore, did little to quell the confusion of the lower courts when
questions over the remaining three torts arise.
Despite the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court stated in
Leopold that there may be circumstances in which privacy
rights should be protected, 119 the appellate courts have been reluctant to extend protection without more specific direction. 120
Although the Leopold decision has apparently made the lower
courts more receptive to the privacy cause of action, the earlier
uncertainty demonstrated by the First District Appellate Court
in Annerino, Bradley, and Carlson has continued to create
confusion.
alized accounts" of his life nor to appropriation of his name or likeness for
use in advertising. Id. at 436-39, 259 N.E.2d at 253-54.
116. Id. at 441, 259 N.E.2d at 254. The court stressed that the plaintiff's
notoriety derived from his criminal conduct. The court refused to allow
plaintiff to assert a right of privacy in his participation in the highly publicized crime. The court stated that the passage of time did not extinguish

public curiosity nor the news interest in the crime, its perpetrators, and

their prosecution. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff had sought

public attention by the publication of his autobiography and other writings.
Finding that the case had become "an historical cause celebre" and that

plaintiff encouraged public attention, the court said he could not withdraw
from the public spotlight at his whim. Id. at 441-43, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
117. Id. at 444-45, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
118. E.g., Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill.
App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980)
(publication concerning condemnation of land is an area of legitimate public interest); Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978)
(publication concerning death of youth from drug overdose concerned matter of legitimate concern to public).
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill.
App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979) (action for invasion of privacy limited to use of individual's name or likeness
for commercial purposes); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d
1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976) (cause of action may be stated for unauthorized
use of an individual's name or likeness for commercial purposes).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVACY LAW IN
ILLINOIS STATE COURTS

Since Leopold, privacy actions brought before Illinois
courts have been based on all four types of objectionable conduct identified by Prosser and the Restatement.121 Express judicial recognition has been extended, however, only to the tort of
appropriation of name or likeness. 122 The elements of the tort
are now well-defined, and no further development of the tort has
occurred in Illinois state courts. The privacy torts of intrusion,
publication of private facts, and false-light publication have not
yet been expressly recognized in Illinois.
Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The cause of action based on the public disclosure of private
facts is the only privacy tort, other than appropriation of name
or likeness for commercial benefit, which has received significant attention by the Illinois appellate courts. 123 Analysis of the
decisions to date indicates that the first and second district
courts are the most receptive to such claims; 124 the Fourth District Appellate Court appears to be less receptive. 125 No other
districts have ruled on this question. 26 The cause of action has
yet to be recognized explicitly; in every case the courts have
121. See Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (appropriation of name or likeness); Adreani v. Hansen, 80 hli. App. 3d
726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980) (publicity which places the plaintiff in false light);
Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979) (intrusion upon seclusion); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979)
(public disclosure of private facts).
122. See, e.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d
(1952) (unauthorized use of photograph in promotion of dog food).
123. See Oden v. Cahill, 79 Ill. App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d 1061 (1979) (disclosure of expunged arrest records); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Mll. App. 3d 435,
390 N.E.2d 945 (1979) (disclosure of patient's name); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 111.App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976) (disclosure of private
debt); Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d
274 (1975) (public disclosure of private debt).
124. In Midwest Glass Co., v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 111. App. 3d 130, 339
N.E.2d 274 (1975), the First District Appellate Court denied the cause of action because the dissemination of the private fact was not to the general
public. The court went on to say that an action for invasion of privacy based
on the public disclosure of private debts may be brought in Illinois. Id. at
135, 339 N.E.2d at 278. In Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d
945 (1979), the Second District Appellate Court denied the cause of action
because the invasion was not sufficiently offensive or objectionable. Id. at
439, 390 N.E.2d at 948.
125. See Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d
37 (1976).
126. In the federal court, however, a corporation asserted a claim for disclosure of private information. The court held that the right of privacy is a
personal right designed to protect persons from unwanted disclosure of personal information. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Local 743 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
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considered either that the facts have been insufficient to establish the cause of action or successful defenses precluded exami127
nation of the issues.
Constitutional protection was given to the publication in
Beresky v. Teschner.128 Although the court noted that the published matter could be interpreted as highly offensive to a reasonable person, 129 the court addressed only the constitutional
guarantees which limit the right of privacy action. The Beresky
court then determined that the articles were matters of legiti30
mate concern to the public.'
In addition to the first amendment defense, the Second District Appellate Court has held that the public character of the
fact disclosed may offer a defense in privacy actions. In Geisberger v. Willuhn, 131 the court held that, in an invasion of privacy by publication of private facts, the information disclosed
must relate to the private, as opposed to the public, life of the
plaintiff. 32 According to the Geisbergercourt, the disclosure of a
person's name, in itself, does not constitute an invasion of priChauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 515 F. Supp. 942, 946
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
127. E.g., Oden v. Cahill, 79 IM.App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d 1061 (1979); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979).
128. 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978). The court found the newspaper articles concerning the death of a youth from a drug overdose a matter of legitimate concern to the public. Id.
129. Id. The article stated that the victim had failed to appear in court to
answer a charge of unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle, that the
victim had been arrested numerous times on various charges, including
traffic violations and burglaries; and that the victim was a major seller and
user of heroin. Id. at 850, 381 N.E.2d at 981. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants exposed to the public the plaintiffs' grief, shame and humiliation because of the publication of the articles. Id. at 856, 381 N.E.2d at 984.
130. The court found that the community had a legitimate interest in
drug activity which caused the death of the teenager. Id. at 856, 381 N.E.2d
at 984.
131. 72 111. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979). This was a case of first impression in Illinois regarding the right of a patient to recover damages from
a physician for the alleged unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information.
132. The complaint was based upon the disclosure of the name of the
plaintiff by an employee of defendant's physician to the police as a possible
suspect in the armed robbery of a department store. The plaintiff was arrested, but the criminal charges were subsequently dismissed. The plaintiff
sued alleging that the disclosure of his name, resulting in his arrest, constituted an invasion of privacy. The court held that the name of a patient
alone is not confidential information protected by statute or by the physician-patient relationship. Id. at 436, 390 N.E.2d at 948. The matter made
public must be one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. Id. at 439, 390 N.E.2d at 948, citing, W.
PROSSER, TORTS, § 117 (4th ed. 1971). Those cases which have recognized
the cause of action have all involved the publication of facts relating to
either the plaintiff's medical condition or the physician's diagnosis or treatment. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 439, 390 N.E.2d at 948.
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vacy. 33 In Oden v. Cahill,3 4 the same court held that even a
135
plaintiff's expunged arrest records were public information.
An action for public disclosure of private debt has been
treated by Illinois courts as a subcategory of public disclosure of
private facts. 3 6 The First District Appellate Court and the
Fourth District Appellate Court have reached conflicting conclusions regarding that tort. In Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co. ,"37 the First District Appellate Court held that an
action for invasion of privacy based on the public disclosure of
private debt may be brought in Illinois. 38 The Midwest Glass
court concluded, however, that it was unable to recognize the
tort in that
case because the facts failed to satisfy the tort's
139
criteria.

The First District Appellate Court's unequivocal statement
that the private debt action could be brought should be a sufficient basis for extending the cause of action when the requisite0
14
facts are finally alleged. In Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott,

the required facts were alleged 141 and the Fourth District Appellate Court was asked to extend the right. That court refused,
however, to extend the right. 142 Instead, the Scott court used
133. Id. Not confronted with a first amendment defense, the court discussed the four forms of invasion of privacy and relied exclusively on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser. Id.
134. 79 Ill. App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d 1061 (1979).
135. The plaintiff charged that the city civil service commission's use of
her expunged arrest records in denying her employment as a police officer
violated her right of privacy. The plaintiff alleged that this conduct violated
not only her common-law right of privacy but also her constitutional right.
Id. at 772, 398 N.E.2d at 1062. The court avoided the constitutional basis for
asserting the right by holding that plaintiff's arrest records were public information. Consequently, neither the common-law nor the constitutional
protection extends to matters of public knowledge. Id.
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
137. 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274 (1975).
138. Id. at 135, 339 N.E.2d at 278.
139. Id. at 132, 339 N.E.2d at 278. Midwest was to install mirrors in apartments in Stanford's condominium development. When Stanford refused to
pay for the mirrors, Midwest sent a notice to sixty-five individuals, including each of the persons who had purchased condominiums or who were tenants. The court held that, because the publication was only to a limited
number of persons who had a proper interest in the information, defendant's conduct did not substantiate the claim. Id.
140. 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976).
141. A collection agency, attempting to force payment of an alleged debt,
made phone calls to plaintiff's parents and repeatedly called the plaintiff at
work, though she demanded that they cease because the calls jeopardized
her job. The plaintiff suffered headaches, loss of appetite, and loss of sleep
due to the language used and threats made. Id. at 1008, 345 N.E.2d at 38.
142. Id. at 1009, 345 N.E.2d at 40. The court implied that the only cause of
action explicitly recognized in Illinois is for the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commercial benefit. Id. In his dissent, Justice
Craven found that the efforts at collection had become so unreasonable and
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the plaintiff's alternate theory for recovery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 143 The Scott court implied that the privacy cause of action was subsumed into the cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the
Scott court gave only cursory treatment to the privacy cause of
action before dismissing it.
The Scott court's reliance on the plaintiff's alternative theory not only continues the conflict among the circuit courts but
it also emphasizes the court's misconception regarding the fundamental distinction between a privacy cause of action and a
cause of action for infliction of mental distress. 144 Mental distress is not the basis of the cause of action in privacy. 145 Special
46
damages are not a requisite element to an action in privacy.
The real nature of the complaint in privacy is the affront to the
plaintiff's personal dignity. 147 Even if a plaintiff were to suffer
mental distress, those consequences would be inseparable from
the indignity suffered by the invasion of privacy.1'4
The facts in Scott also presented the court with an opportunity to discuss two other privacy torts-intrusion and false light
outrageous that they transcended the plaintiff's implied consent. Id. at
1010, 345 N.E.2d at 41 (Craven, J., dissenting). A defense of implied consent
defeated the cause of action in Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 11. App. 3d
158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (plaintiff had supplied the names of former em-

ployers in the credit report).
Several courts have held that the creditor will not be found liable if he
took reasonable steps under the circumstances to collect the debt. See

Cunningham v. Securities Inv. Co., 278 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1960) (right to take
non-oppressive action to collect debt); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala.
174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (conduct must be reasonably related to legitimate
effort to collect debt); Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682,
100 S.E.2d 881 (1957) (letter to employer is reasonable step); Housh v. Peth,
165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (creditor must take reasonable steps).
143. Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill.
App. 3d at 1007-08, 345 N.E.2d
at 40. Because the court upheld Count I of the complaint alleging an intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, the court saw no need to create
additional remedies. Id. at 1009, 345 N.E.2d -at 40.
144. Id. at 1007-08, 345 N.E.2d at 40.
145. Bloustein, supra note 4, at 1002. Bloustein wrote: "[TI he spiritual
characteristic which is at issue is not a form of trauma, mental illness or
distress, but rather individuality or freedom." Id.
146. Id. at 973. See also Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148
S.E. 414 (1929) (recovery for nervous shock from unwarranted search &
seizure); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (damages allowed although injuries resulted only from mental anguish); Welsh v.

Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (presumption of detriment and

damage when stranger usurps man's home); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144
W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959) (recovery for emotional and mental
anguish without ascertainable physical injuries); Roach v. Harper, 143 W.
Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (special damages not necessary to recover for
invasion of privacy); Prosser, supra note 2, at 409.
147. Bloustein , supra note 4, at 973.
148. Id.
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publicity-which have not previously been addressed by any Illinois court. 149 The Scott majority failed to use the opportunity.
In the dissent, Justice Craven found that the plaintiff stated a
cause of action, not only for publication of private facts, but also
for unreasonable intrusion and for false-light publicity. 150 Justice Craven cited the decision of the First District Appellate
Court in Midwest Glass and noted that the Midwest Glass court
would have allowed a remedy for publication of private debts
15 1
based on these facts.
The conflict between the holdings in Midwest Glass and
Scott has not yet been resolved. The well-reasoned holding in
Midwest Glass was reached only after a careful examination of
Illinois law,152 the decisions of other jurisdictions, 153 and other
authorities. 154 The perfunctory dismissal of the privacy claim in
Scott, on the other hand, may be viewed as an example of a
court's reluctance to extend rights in a developing area of the
law in the absence of clear judicial or legislative precedent.
UnreasonableIntrusion upon Seclusion
Thus far, Illinois courts have denied recognition of the tort
of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. It appears that only
the first and fifth districts have ruled on this question. 155 Both of
149. One of the other counts of the complaint alleged unreasonable intrusion upon plaintiffs seclusion and solitude, and the other alleged publicity

which unreasonably placed her in a false light. Bureau of Credit Control v.
Scott, 36 IMI.
App. 3d at 1008, 345 N.E.2d at 38.
150. Id. at 1010, 345 N.E.2d at 40 (Craven, J., dissenting).
151. Citing Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339
N.E.2d 274 (1975), the dissent stated: "A complaint that alleges an intentional giving of unreasonable publicity to private debts without consent of
the debtor for the purpose of coercing payment states a cause of action."
Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 1010, 345 N.E.2d at 41
(Craven, J., dissenting).
152. The court noted that the right of privacy and a remedy for violation
of that right are recognized in the Illinois Constitution and by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Leopold v. Levin, 45 IMI.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970). Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 339 N.E.2d at 27677.
153. The court pointed out that Prosser's categorization has been
adopted by many foreign jurisdictions, see, e.g., Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of
Pennsylvania, 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan.
201, 531 P.2d 1 (1975). The court also examined other jurisdictions to determine the elements of the tort. The court cited decisions reached in Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Oregon, and Ohio.
154. Among the authorities discussed by the court are W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971); the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS; Annot., 33

A.L.R. 3d 154 (1970); and 62 Am. JUR. 2d Privacy § 39 (1942).

155. See, e.g., Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979)

(First District Appellate Court); Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60
Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978) (First District Appellate Court); Bank
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these courts agreed that the acts of the defendant must be "unreasonably" intrusive to support the tort. 5 6 Even where the acts
of a defendant are sufficiently intrusive, however, the plaintiffs
15 7
status as a public official may prevent assertion of the right.
Although in agreement on the issue of intrusiveness, there
is still a conflict between the courts. The Fifth District Appellate
Court

58

has expressed its opinion that, if the facts were ever

sufficient, the Illinois Supreme Court would probably recognize
the action in its own right. 59 The First District Appellate
Court,160 on the other hand, has asserted that actions for inva-

sions of privacy in Illinois are limited6to appropriation of name
or likeness for commercial purposes.' '
False Light

Two cases in Illinois have explicitly alleged a cause of action
for publicity which placed the plaintiffs in a false light. 16 2 The
facts in each case were insufficient to establish a prima facie
of Indiana v. Tremunde, 50 Ill. App. 3d 480, 365 N.E.2d 295 (1977) (Fifth District Appellate Court).
156. Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 646, 391 N.E.2d at 58; Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 50 IlM. App. 3d at 483, 365 N.E.2d at 298.
157. Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 111. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d
126 (1978). Plaintiff, an undercover police officer investigating prostitution,
was filmed by defendant's camera crew who were hidden behind a false
wall. The film was shown on a local television news program. The court

held that the public has a legitimate interest in the conduct of police officers

while on duty. Id. at 838, 377 N.E.2d at 128. The court did suggest, however,
that had the plaintiff been a private citizen engaged in private conduct or

had the plaintiff questioned the motives of the defendants, the outcome
may have been different. Id. at 839, 377 N.E.2d at 132.

158. Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 50 Ill. App. 3d 480, 365 N.E.2d 295
(1977).
159. The court said, "[W] e assume, on the basis of the Leopold case, that
our supreme court would recognize such an action were appropriate facts
alleged and proved." Id. at 483, 365 N.E.2d at 298. In the dissent, however,
Justice Moran found that the facts alleged were sufficient to sustain the
cause of action. Id. at 486-87, 365 N.E.2d at 298 (Moran, J., dissenting). The
plaintiffs, both over seventy years of age, were in possession of a farm when
defendant's agents entered onto the farm after dark and replevied the cattle
and equipment on the farm onto their trucks. Id. at 484-85, 365 N.E.2d at 29697. The plaintiffs suffered severe mental and physical distress because of
the intrusion. Id. at 486-87, 365 N.E.2d at 296-97.
160. Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979).
161. The court devoted substantial space to a discussion of the cause of
action. The court reviewed decisions of other jurisdictions principally to
determine whether the facts alleged would have sustained the cause of action in those jurisdictions. The court found no cases which would uphold a
cause of action for invasion of privacy based upon unsolicited telephone
calls occurring on an unspecified number of occasions but which did not
involve any other harassing conduct. Id. at 647, 391 N.E.2d at 58.
162. Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980); Bureau
of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976).
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case. 163 In addition, the First District Appellate Court found
that the proceedings, about which the statements had been
made, concerned a matter of legitimate public interest.164 The
court supported its position by stating that the Illinois Supreme
Court narrowly construed the right of privacy when balanced
1 65
against the publication of a matter of public interest.
DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVACY LAW BY ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURTS

The Illinois state legislature and judiciary have apparently
not been eager to expand plaintiffs' privacy rights. Illinois federal courts, on the other hand, have been less reticent. 166 The
only real advances in privacy law in Illinois have been made by
the federal courts sitting in that jurisdiction.
The muddled reasoning and confusion underlying Illinois
state court decisions have, of course, affected the decisions of
the Illinois federal courts. 167 In two recent cases, decided within
seven months of each other, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois reached contradictory holdings.
In CNA FinancialCorp. v. Local 743 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 168 the court
held that the privacy cause of action is based on a personal,
163. In Adreani, plaintiffs brought an action for invasion of privacy for
statements contained in a letter to the editor which accused them of greed
and disgraceful business practices and attacked their integrity, honesty, capacity and ability to carry on their professions. Plaintiffs were builders and
real estate developers who were the beneficial owners of property which
the park district sought to acquire through condemnation proceedings. 80
Ill. App. 3d at 727, 400 N.E.2d at 680-81. In Bureau of Credit Control, a collection agency attempted to collect payment of a debt by making phone calls to
plaintiffs parents and to plaintiff at work. The plaintiff demanded that the
agency cease making the calls since they jeopardized her job and caused
headaches, loss of appetite, and loss of sleep. 36 Ill. App. 3d at 1008, 345
N.E.2d at 38. An Illinois federal district court has recognized this privacy
tort. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
164. The court reasoned that the negotiations, as well as the condemnation proceedings, placed plaintiffs in the midst of a public controversy
which was of legitimate public interest. Adreani v. Hansen, 80 111. App. 3d at
730, 400 N.E.2d at 683.
165. Id. The court referred to an observation by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970), that the
United States Supreme Court weighed the public and private interests in
its decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
166. See supra notes 102, 126, and infra notes 168-89 and accompanying
text.
167. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal court is
bound to apply the law as it believes the Illinois Supreme Court would apply it.
168. 515 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Ia. 1981).
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rather than a property, right.169 The court, therefore, refused to
allow a corporation to assert a right of privacy claim. 170 In
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo,171 on the other hand, the
court ignored Illinois law, 172 an earlier holding of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, 173 and even its own holding in CNA
FinancialCorp.
174
The Winterland court recognized a "right of publicity"'
based on the appropriation of name and likeness. The com-

169. The corporation alleged a claim for the publication of private facts
based on the disclosure of information acquired in the regular course of

business. Id. See supra notes 101-02, 126 and accompanying text.
170. The court cited cases from California, Kentucky, New York and

Pennsylvania which have held that a corporation cannot maintain an action
for invasion of the right of privacy. Id. Contra UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-8

(1965) which gives corporations, as well as persons, the right to assert a
privacy claim.
171. 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. I. 1981).
172. The federal court's holding in Winterland is contrary to the only
statement by an Illinois court on the subject. In Carlson v. Dell Publishing
Co., Inc., 65 Ill.
App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965), an Illinois court held that
there is no cause of action for a violation of the right of privacy concerning a
publication occurring after the death of the principal. The implication is
that the right of privacy is a personal right because a property right may be
asserted after the death of the principal. See supra notes 101-02, 169 and
accompanying text.
173. The Winterland decision totally ignores the precedential importance of Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 883 (1965). The Maritote court cited with approval the authorities
of other jurisdictions which held that a right of privacy is purely personal.
Id. at 419. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
174. The publicity right is based on the theory that, if a man has a publicity value in his name or photograph, he should enjoy the exclusive privilege
of capitalizing on it. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See also Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBS. 203 (1954).
The right of publicity has been explicitly recognized in other jurisdictions. E.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc., 694 F.2d
674 (11th Cir. 1983); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d

481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.

Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal.Rptr. 35
(1977); McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63, rev'd on other
grounds, 224 Ga. 420, 162 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Canessa v. J. I.Kislak, Inc., 97
N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S.
562 (1977).
In Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), the court outlines a three-part test for establishing a right of publicity
claim:
An individual claiming a violation of his right to publicity must show:
(1) that his name or likeness has publicity value; (2) that he himself
has 'exploited' his name or likeness by acting 'in such a way as to evidence his ... own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his
...name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in some over
manner'; and (3) that defendant has appropriated this right of publicity,
without consent, for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.
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plaint alleged the appropriation of the right of publicity for the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of shirts bearing the names
of Winterland's licensors without their permission. 175 In reaching its decision, the court determined that that right of publicity
is a species of the right of privacy. 176 Contrary to the Illinois
appellate court decision in Carlson, however, the district court
held that the right of publicity is transferrable and assignable. 177
Oblivious to the inconsistencies created by the decisions of
the First and Fourth District appellate courts, the same district
court in Challen v. Town and Country Charge178 looked only to
Midwest Glass Co. 179 as authority on a claim for public disclosure of private debt. In Challen, the defendant had addressed
one letter to plaintiff's employer in order to seek the employer's
assistance in collecting a debt; he was not making an "unreasonable" attempt to coerce or harass the debtor into paying the debt
by holding his private problems up to public disgrace. 80 The
court found that the prima facie case for public disclosure of private debt, as articulated in Midwest Glass Co.,181 had been
Id. at 232, quoting Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
175. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Two defendants operated a bootleg shirt business bearing the names
and/or likenesses of such entertainers and musical groups as the Rolling
Stones, Pat Benetar, Jefferson Starship, Electric Light Orchestra, Santana
and others. Id. at 1204-05.
176. Id. at 1213.
177. The court considered it an extension of the tort of appropriation of a
plaintiff's name or likeness. Therefore, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs were entitled to the sole right to exploit their names and likenesses.
Citing its own earlier decision in the same case, and cases from the federal
courts in California and New York, the court held that the plaintiffs could
legally and validly transfer their right of publicity. Winterland Concessions
Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213-14 (N.D. IM. 1981).
Several courts have described the nature of the right of publicity as a
property right. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v.

Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956); Haelan

Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970). See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y.. 1953); Felcher
& Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real People by the Media,
88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979). Contra Memphis Dev., Etc. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616

F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM LAw. R. 453 (1981).
178. 545 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
179. Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill.
App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d
274 (1975).

180. 545 F. Supp. at 1016-17. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying
text.
181. The elements are: "(1) an intentional giving of unreasonable public-

ity; (2) to private debts; (3) without the debtor's consent; (4) made for the

purpose of coercing or harassing the debtor into payment of the debt or of
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stated. Had the facts been sufficient, the court implied that it
would have allowed the claim. 182 The Challen holding was cited
one year later in Bond v. Pecaut183 when the court held that recovery for publication of private facts would be limited only to
"unreasonable" intrusions on plaintiff's privacy. 184
In Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,185
the facts were sufficient for the district court to recognize the
tort of privacy which unreasonably places another in a false
light before the public.1 8 6 In Cantrell, the plaintiff sued the television network and two of its employees, Geraldo Rivera and Peter Lance, alleging that a broadcast on ABC, entitled
"Newsmagazine 20/20," injured his reputation. The "20/20" investigation concerned an alleged arson-for-profit conspiracy in
the Uptown neighborhood of Chicago.18 7 The court held that the
segment implied that the plaintiff was involved in the commission of a crime, that no constitutional defenses were available to
the defendants, and that the defendants acted either with
knowledge of the broadcast's falsity or in reckless disregard of
its truth.1 88 No Illinois case has expressly recognized the privacy tort of false-light publicity. Nevertheless, in a scholarly
and well-reasoned opinion, Judge Kocoras determined that the
Illinois Supreme Court would have found that this was an area
within which "citizens must be left alone."1 89
SOLUTIoN-A REEMERGENCE OF THE UNITY THEORY

A cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy has
exposing the debtor to public contempt or ridicule." Id. at 1016, citing Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill.
App. 3d 130, 133, 339 N.E.2d 274,
277 (1975).
182. 545 F. Supp. at 1016.
183. 561 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
184. Id. at 1041. Plaintiff sued a psychologist for publication of private
facts caused by a letter written by the psychologist to the presiding judge in
a child custody proceeding. The court stated that the letter was at most a
reasonable intrusion on plaintiff's privacy. Id.
185. 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. ]1l. 1981).
186. Id. at 759.
187. Id. at 748.
188. Id. at 759.
189. Id. Judge Kocoras cited a decision of the United States Supreme
Court concerning privacy and the press. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), Justice Brennan wrote:
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of
matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant
published the report with the knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
Id. at 387-88. The holding does not apply to all privacy suits since only a
small percentage involve falsity.
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been recognized in Illinois. 9 0° Inconsistencies in the reasoning
and the holdings of the appellate courts, however, have effectively limited the recognition of that right to the single tort of
appropriation of name or likeness for commercial purposes. Although some Illinois courts have expressed a willingness to extend the right of privacy action beyond that one tort, 191 the right
case has apparently never presented the opportunity to do so.
The common law of privacy has experienced significant development in other jurisdictions, spurred by changing social values and technological advances. In Illinois, the development of
privacy law is still in its infancy. Virtually, the only privacy action explicitly recognized today is appropriation of name or likeness for commercial exploitation. The absence of clearlydefined standards has created serious problems for plaintiffs in
Illinois.
Illinois' problems may stem from the confusion created by
the intermingling and blending of privacy concepts. 9 2 At the
heart of this confusion is the failure of the Illinois Supreme
Court to articulate clear, consistent guidelines for privacy actions. Consequently, until the Illinois courts, or the Illinois legislature, formulate the basis for a privacy cause of action, Illinois
plaintiffs will remain uncertain when, or even if, they are entitled to recover for a particular injury. Without a clearly defined
state policy, the success of any given suit would depend on a
variety of factors, including which circuit court may be hearing
the case.
Awareness of broadening social policies should provide impetus for the judiciary to expand the limited common law privacy action which has already been recognized by the court.
Recognizing the need for continued development of the law in
the light of changing social attitudes, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently granted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 193 This action is an indication of the expansion of a

plaintiff's right to recover for mental harm alone. In light of the
readiness of the Illinois Supreme Court to recognize claims to
emotional injury, and in light of the fact that privacy actions
190. Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
191. See, e.g., Adreani v. Hansen, 80 M1.App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980);
Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 IlM. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126
(1978); Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 1. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d
274 (1975).
192. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
193. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
Under Rickey, a court would allow recovery for emotional distress to a bystander who has a reasonable fear for his own safety. Id. at 552, 457 N.E.2d
at 6.
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have attendent mental and emotional qualities, 94 the Illinois
Supreme court should expand the remedies available to plaintiffs whose privacy has been violated.
In their article, Warren and Brandeis noted that the law has
always sought to fully protect the individual in his person and in
his property. 195 The right to life is now synonymous with the
right to enjoy life. The personal right to live in peace and solitude is threatened by the encroachment of advancing technology. The Warren-Brandeis concept underlying the purpose of
the remedy for invading a person's privacy should be revitalized; only in this way can the courts shed the barricades created
by Prosser's fourfold categorization of the privacy tort.
Prosser himself predicted the confusion which his categorization could cause. 19 6 In an article published just four years
later, an eminent scholar urged the legal community to discard
Prosser's analysis. 1 97 He examined the Prosser categorization
and determined that it was a repudiation of the general theory
198
of individual privacy which Warren and Brandeis invoked.
The development of privacy law in Illinois has verified Prosser's prediction. Illinois courts have treated the Prosser categorization as the ultimate definition of the elements of the causes
of action for invasion of privacy. The courts' failure to extend
the right beyond the categorization has left Illinois plaintiffs
without a remedy for the tort which was originally intended to
protect man's right to live his life without the world intruding
upon him. 99
A unitary approach to the privacy tort may help to clarify
the reasoning of the Illinois courts. The unification of the elements of the privacy cause of action, with all applicable defenses and limitations, would reestablish the primacy of human
dignity as a cherished value of the American legal system. Despite its widespread recognition and acceptance, it may be time
to reconsider Prosser's fourfold categorization in light of the
ever-changing needs of a complex society. 20 0 Prosser's article
was, after all, only an attempt to classify "over three hundred
20 2
cases in the books" 20 ' according to "four different interests.t
Today, the courts are refusing to recognize threats to a person's
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Prosser, supra note 2, at 422-34.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193.
Prosser, supra note 2, at 389.
Bloustein, supra note 147, at 963-64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Prosser, supra note 2, at 388.
Id. at 389.
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"inviolate personality" 20 3 because they are bound to a mere categorization of case law, made in the infancy of privacy law.
Although Prosser apparently believed he was exploding the
Warren-Brandeis myth of a single distinctive interest known as
privacy, he was, in actuality, creating a new myth-that of a
composite interest in privacy protecting myriad species of social
values. 2°4 The injury which an individual suffers as a result of a
violation of his privacy is an injury to his individuality and
human dignity.20 5 A cause of action alleging such a violation
should not fail simply because it defies categorization.
CONCLUSION

Illinois state law must be clarified in order to alleviate the
problems faced by the Illinois federal courts and the resulting
Erie problem.20 6 In addition, Illinois plaintiffs must be allowed a
remedy in Illinois state courts, if only to discourage the forum
shopping of plaintiffs who look to federal courts for more
favorable treatment.
The absence of defined standards, at the same time,
presents a real opportunity. Illinois could, as it has done in the
past in other areas of law, establish a pattern for the country. It
could be the first to totally discard the Prosser categorization.
Illinois could develop, in its place, a law of privacy which more
accurately reflects the changing character of our modern society
and which protects the individual from the many varieties of intrusive conduct made possible by technological advances.
Angela Imbierowicz

203. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 205. See also supra note 4 and
accompanying text. The need to protect individual privacy was recognized
by the First District Appellate Court of Illinois in Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill.
App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958). The court stated that, in its
adoption of the broad language of the common-law right of privacy, the
court intended to protect the individual from more than commercial exploitation. The court then used the language of Warren and Brandeis to
state that it "fully intended to protect inviolate the personality of the
individual."
204. Bloustein, supra note 4, at 1003.
205. Id.
206. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

